Descriptive representation is generally defined as the representation of groups by individuals who share the same ascribed qualities (Pitken 1967). The ability of democratic institutions to respond to previously excluded interests is the overriding issue in a discussion of descriptive representation. But should we expect the inclusion of Latinos, or any racial or ethnic minority group, to alter state welfare or other general policies? The theoretical and empirical evidence fails to provide a clear answer, which only serves to add to the need for additional investigation.
Several lines of argument suggest we should not expect policy responsiveness from minority descriptive representation. First, in all of the American states, Latinos remain numeric minorities in state legislative bodies; and exerting influence in the face of majoritarian representative institutions, even as members, is not a straightforward endeavor (Guiner 1992) . Given a differentiated set of group preferences, and an undercurrent of racial resentment that coincides with the same jurisdictional demographics that would produce more minority legislators (i.e., a larger minority population leads to both higher numbers of minority representatives and lower levels of welfare provision), the ability of a numeric minority to move policy is certainly questionable. Moreover, racism within the lawmaking institution may preclude or mitigate any minority influence even when minority lawmakers align themselves with nonminority interests (Hawkesworth 2003) . A second line of argument posits that structural determinants are the basis for policy response to civil rights and minority interests (Klinkner and Smith 1999) . While primarily applied at the national level, states may not respond, even in the face of growing representational or coalitional participation, if there is not a fundamental threat to security or federal intervention does not force such an action. Third, it may be that minority interests are substantively represented regardless of their representatives' racial or ethnic background (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Swain 1995) . Finally, Lublin (1997) argued that the creation of majority-minority districts, which have led to increases of both black and Latino representatives, may lead to losses in substantive representation. This occurs as minority voters are packed into relatively few districts, resulting in overall losses in Democratic seats and, subsequently, in Democratic majorities that otherwise champion black or Latino causes. These arguments suggest that an increase in Latino elected officials does not automatically lead to greater policy influence and could reasonably explain why such electoral success fails to counter the effects of racial resentment. And indeed, the one comparative study of state expenditures to examine the effects of Latino representation in state legislatures found that greater Latino representation is associated with lower per capita welfare expenditures (Nelson 1991 ).
Yet there is an ample theoretical basis, and empirical evidence, that leads one to expect that descriptive representation transcends symbolic inclusion and alters public policy. On its face, inclusion of previously excluded groups should change the dynamics of lawmaking, even if it does not change the pivotal median voter. The shared experiences of minority group members translate into a unique ability of minority lawmakers to represent the interests of constituents from their respective racial or ethnic group. A minority voice in representative bodies, in turn, provides a mechanism for interest representation that would not otherwise be available. As Luis Fraga (1992, 281) argued, "Latinos and Blacks are strategically placed as elected officials to call to question the rhetoric of the 'interests of the larger community' that usually only reflect whites' interests as told by their representatives" (emphasis added). Reducing racism within the representative institution, providing more responsive case work, and legitimizing the institutions of civil society in the eyes of minority citizens are among the potential benefits offered by advocates of descriptive representation (Mansbridge 1999 ). Yet as Dovi (2002) pointed out, the descriptive representatives must then reflect the particular concerns of the minority group they represent, rather than advocating for nondifferentiated policy positions. Finally, numbers ought to matter; and even a few descriptive representatives can alter policy if they act through strong coalitions. Browning, Marshall, and Tabb's (1984) theory of incorporation best captures this argument by suggesting that it is the combination of representation and membership in the dominant coalition that produces policy gains for minority groups as group members join the ranks of elected officials. Dominant coalition membership at the state level provides additional benefits, such as the power of committee chairs and majority party and chamber leadership positions. Since these positions grant additional influence to office holders (Francis 1989; Jewell and Whicker 1994) , the combination of representation and incorporation should induce policy movement toward minority interests.
Empirical support for the influence of minority descriptive representation is quite ambiguous. Individually, minority descriptive representatives tend to propose and support minority interest legislation to a greater degree then their white counterparts, but also tend to be less successful in seeing their policy agenda's pass through the legislative process (Bratton and Haynie 1999 The Paths to Influence Three causal paths should be accounted for to understand the potential for incorporation to offset racial resentment in legislative decisions. Figure 2 presents a stylized model of these paths to influence as suggested by a theory of minority incorporation that illustrates the basic components of a process that leads from population groups directly to policy outcomes, and indirectly via incorporation of descriptive representatives into legislative bodies (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984) . These paths include Afrom population to political incorporation; B-from incorporation to public policy outputs; and Cdirectly from population to policy. C is the path suggested by models that examine only the effects of minority population on public policy. This "population to policy" conception overlooks paths A and B, and thus potentially misses an important aspect of real-world politics in representative democracies.
The theory of minority incorporation argues that paths A and B represent theoretically important relationships (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; also see Haynie 2001) . That is, population size positively influences levels of political incorporation, and in turn, incorporation allows minority groups to affect public policy, albeit through institutionalized representation. The path from population to policy output, C, however, may still lead to negative effects since minorities, by definition, will be at a disadvantage when competing over broad policy decisions in majoritarian institutions. Thus, two issues should be addressed beyond the simple impact of minority population size. The first issue, and the guiding concern of this study, is the degree to which incorporation, path B, offsets the negative effects found between group size and policy, or path C. Second, the nature of the relationship between population and incorporation, path A, is generally overlooked in studies of policy influence, but clearly links the population to policy via minority incorporation into decision-making bodies. All three relationships will be examined in the following sections to determine the impact of minority population size and representation on welfare policy in the states.
State Legislative Representation and the Theory of Incorporation
The empirical analysis that follows focuses on state legislative incorporation of racial or ethnic minorities, defined broadly as the election of minority representatives and the degree to which those representatives hold institutional positions of power within legislatures (see Haynie 2001) . The states are a valuable venue from which to investigate the effects of minority representation and its potential ability to offset racial resentment since race and ethnic population size are well-established determinants of state policy and social welfare policy in particular (Brown 1995 
Latino Population and Incorporation
The analysis of the effects of population and representation is based on the path model presented in terms between Latino population variables and MMDs were not significant in any of the yearly analyses. The principal variables of Latino population and its squared term are nonetheless strong predictors, with the models explaining between 88 to 96 percent of the variation in the sixteen yearly regressions. Table 1 's cost of living index (p. 372) . The welfare benefit analysis employs the first difference to evaluate effects on changing policy and is thus limited to the years 1997 and 1998. These three measures provide distinct proxies for welfare generosity and thus allow for a fairly robust test of the effects of incorporation. The pooled correlation coefficients are only .09 between welfare generosity and effort and .14 between the welfare benefit index and welfare effort. The welfare generosity and welfare effort variables are transformed to moving averages based on the current year, as well as forward lags of one and two years. The moving averages refocus the study on broad policy trends, rather than yearly disturbances that may lead to spurious results. The time frame employed for the moving average calculation compliments the lags employed for the independent variables discussed below. The short time series of the post-TANF welfare benefit index (three years of data) requires a slightly different approach that is explained in more detail below.
Key independent variables include Latino population and Latino legislative incorporation. Both are measured as described above, but smoothed with a moving average that includes the current year and values for the previous one and two year lags. This construction of the moving average for the independent variables alleviates concerns regarding the temporal causal sequence given that forward lags are applied to the dependent variables. Including three years in the average also fits the reality that legislative power is most likely exerted over a longer period than one discrete year.7 Again, negative coefficients for the population variables will indicate the presence of racial resentment. Positive coefficients for the legislative incorporation variable provide evidence of the ability of Latino representation to influence welfare policy outputs. If both coefficients reflect these anticipated directional relationships, the analysis will support the claim that incorporation can mitigate the effects of racial resentment.
In addition to the independent variables used to test theories of racial resentment and incorporation, controls for a number of plausible alternative explanations are included in the models. First, Black Population, the percentage of the state's population that is black, is included since racial resentment regarding welfare policy is commonly attributed to racialized perceptions of welfare recipients (Gilens 1999 (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996) .8 The coefficients for Latino Legislative Incorporation are positive and significant in all three models. Confirming previous studies' findings of racial resentment, the coefficients for the Latino population variable are negative and significant in the models of welfare effort and the welfare benefit index. A positive but insignificant coefficient (b = .0001) was found in the generosity model. These findings give strong support to the theory of incorporation but also suggest that undercurrents of racial resentment continue to tug at welfare policy decisions.
The influence of each of the remaining predictors differs in significance, and sometimes direction, across the three indicators of the welfare state.9 Higher black populations tend to lower welfare effort and generosity but did not change welfare benefits. Democratic legislatures and governors had mixed effects, with both positive and negative coefficients across welfare policy indicators. Mass liberalism had no effect in any model. Southern states, however, tended to have higher welfare effort but lower welfare generosity. Party competition was not significant in any models. Higher unemployment rates tend to lead to increases in welfare effort, and reduce post-TANF benefits, but have no significant effects on pre-TANF generosity. States with higher proportions of high school graduates did, however, tend to reduce post-TANF welfare benefits and have lower welfare effort levels. More densely populated states tended to have higher welfare generosity levels but were otherwise no different from other states. As expected, the lagged dependent variables explain much of the variance when they are included in the estimation procedure, and provide a strong control for testing the incorporation thesis. The total effects are estimated by inserting into the welfare models the predicted level of incorporation derived from modeling incorporation as a function of population and its squared term."11 The solid line in each graph represents the total effects of Latino population on the welfare policy indicators (paths A, B, and C combined). Subsequently, the solid line illustrates the influence of population and incorporation, as variation in population leads to variation in incorporation.
The distance between the solid line (total effects) and the dashed line (direct effects) can be interpreted as the degree to which Latino incorporation offsets racial resentment. Until the population approaches approximately 10 percent Latino, the total effects track closely to the direct effects. Regardless of incorporation, welfare effort and post-TANF benefits decline as the Latino population grows from a nominal size to 10 percent of the population.12 After that point, however, incorporation influences policy in a distinct manner. In dollar amounts, the degree of mitigation varies across policies. Based on the average per capita income of the sample, the difference between states with Latino legislative incorporation and those without equates to about $9 in annual per capita welfare expenditures when Latinos make up 20 percent of the population, and about $58 at 40 percent. The overall average per capita welfare expenditure was $563 for the entire sample. For welfare generosity, the difference in monthly AFDC maximum benefits for a family of four was $6 at 20 percent Latinos, and $26 at 40 percent. Average AFDC maximum monthly benefits were $596 during the period of the study. Finally, the difference in estimated changes in the corresponding dollar amount for the welfare benefit index (maximum monthly TANF benefits for a family of three) between unincorporated states and incorporated states was $14 at 20 percent Latino and $91 at 40 percent, relative to an overall average monthly benefit during this period of $641. Thus, when Latinos constitute relatively high percentages of the population (about 20 percent), the effects are real. The estimated effects are also effects on yearly change, which over a period of several years can mean substantial differences between states with incorporation and those without.
Overall, the evidence suggests that descriptive representation matters and that incorporation in legislative bodies provides a democratic process that responds, rather than reacts, to minority groups. The important caveat is that while incorporation is a function of population, it is by no means a perfectly responsive one. During this time period, states with Latino populations beyond the point that incorporation potentially benefits Latinos (greater than 10 percent) spanned from only five states in 1984 to ten states in 2001. The remaining states tended to exhibit the negative relationship between Latino population and welfare generosity, and legislative incorporation did not overcome this phenomenon.
Conclusion
Does descriptive representation of previously excluded minority groups offset the impact of racial resentment in redistributive macro-policy decisions? The answer seems to be yes, with some important qualifications. As the analysis revealed, incorporation of Latino descriptive representatives in state legislatures leads to relative increases in welfare expenditure effort, welfare generosity, and welfare benefits in the states. Unlike previous findings related to Latino incorporation (Nelson 1991 The important implication of the results is that statelevel democratic institutions are able to respond to previously excluded groups. And after a critical mass of minority population is reached and incorporation is attained, there is a degree of influence generated, even beyond traditional factors such as party control and state liberalism. In short, descriptive representation matters to policy outputs; and inclusion of Latinos into the exclusive ranks of representative institutions holds promise for more responsive policies. Or, at least, the findings demonstrate that democratic institutions, as per design, can offset majoritarian inclinations.
Finally, the other studies presented in this symposium suggest some interesting implications for the results presented here. First, the central finding that representative institutions hold promise for minority group influence seems to be extended beyond racial and ethnic minority groups by Haidel-Markel, Querze, Since none of the states relied on at-large districts, and multimember districts (MMDs) impose similar electoral dynamics, a test of a multiple representative districting scheme must rely on MMDs as the key structural element in this analysis. In addition, interactions between party competition and the population variables were examined to evaluate if highly competitive party structures increased the degree of Latino incorporation. None of these interactions were significant. 5. This is similar to the 5.2 percent threshold found in a recent study of school board elections and, given a one-standarderror shift in the intercept of the models reported here, is actually statistically indistinguishable from that study (Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004, 1232).
6. While Latino legislator data is available from 1984, the starting point of 1986 is due to the use of a three-year moving average of the Latino Legislative Incorporation index, which requires 1986 to be the first year included in the statistical analysis.
7. Analyses not employing moving averages produce coefficients for the key independent variables that are in the same direction as those reported here, but significance levels generally only approach or just reach the p < .10 level, and thus highlight the utility of a broader, and arguably more accurate longer-term conception of the basis of legislative power.
8. Given the relationship between Latino population and Latino legislative incorporation variables, inclusion of both in the same model leads to some potential concerns. First, the variables are highly collinear, with a pooled correlation coefficient of .85. Collinearity, however, tends to make standard errors inefficient, which actually leads to a stronger test of the independent effects. Moreover, variance inflation factors (VIFs) for a pooled regression do not exceed 6.2 for the benefit index model, 4.9 for the effort model, and 4.2 for the generosity model. All are well below the cautionary level of 10. Second, one could conceive of the incorporation score as an endogenous variable, determined primarily by population size and its squared term. One way to deal with this issue is to use an instrumental variable model, with incorporation modeled as a function of the population and population-squared, purging the effects of population on incorporation within the model. A fixedeffects generalized two-stage least squares estimator was used to deal with this potential endogeneity problem, with results reported in Appendix B. The results are substantively similar to those reported above, with the benefit index model losing efficiency in the estimates, but maintaining the signs of the reported model. Given the temporal causal sequence between the two variables, the general interpretation is based on the estimates reported in Table 2. 9. Recall that the indicators were not highly correlated, and thus alternative processes may be the cause of this result.
10. The significance of both the lagged dependent variable and many yearly variables may be another cause of the lack of significance for some of the other substantive variables. Since the models are well specified, and the goal is to test the theory of incorporation, the insignificance of these variables is not very disconcerting.
11. From Table 1 12. Notably, the inflection point approximates the population size where Fording (1997) found insurgency to increase welfare benefits when blacks had access to electoral institutions. While only speculative, it may be that this is where black representation could respond to black demands.
